# 1NC

## **Off**

Their apocalyptic warming focus trades off with environmentalism – turns the whole case

Crist, 7(Eileen Crist, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse”, http://journal.telospress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/2007/141/29.full.pdf+html)

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge ever 1964 work, an entire socio-cultural-economic life—from (actual or aspired to) ways of eating and lodging, transportation, entertainment, or emoting and thinking—“binds the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole.” Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1991), p. 12. Horkheimer and Adorno traced the origins of the collective’s participation in its own domination to the “historical” moment that magical control over nature (and over the deities of nature) was relinquished to a specific elite or clique in exchange for self and social preservation. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972), pp. 21–22. After the decisive turn when the social body became implicated in its own domination, “what is done to all by the few, always occurs as the subjection of individuals by the many: social repression always exhibits the masks of repression by a collective” (ibid.). And elsewhere: “The misplaced love of the common people for the wrong which is done them is a greater force than the cunning of the authorities” (ibid., p. 134). In light of such astute observations offered by critical theorists, neo-Marxist and anarchist analyses that indict corporate and/or state power for the troubled natural and social worlds are, at best, only partially true. 20. More than thirty years ago, environmental philosopher Arne Naess articulated the influential distinction between “shallow” and “deep” ecology, characterized by the focus on symptoms of the environmental crisis, on the one hand, versus critical attention to underlying causes of problems, on the other. Notwithstanding its unfortunate elitist overtones—implying that some environmental thinkers are capable of reflecting deeply, while others flounder with superficialities—the shallow-deep distinction has been significant for two compelling reasons. One, it clarified how “symptomology” leads merely to technical piecemeal solutions; and two, it showed how underlying causes, left unaddressed, eventually generate more nasty symptoms. In other words, shallow ecological thinking is technical and narrow: when we think about climate change as “the problem”—as opposed to confronting the limitless expansionism of the capitalist enterprise as the problem—we arguably become shallow in our thinking. Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long- Range Ecology Movements,” in George Sessions, ed., Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1973; Boston: Shambhala, 1995), pp. 151–55. on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

The affirmative’s apocalyptic vision causes fear production and disengagement with the world – however, it is this fear of the possibility of danger that turns humans into calculative chips and effaces what it means to be alive

Debrix & Barder 11 (François Debrix, PhD from Purdue, director of the Alliance for Social, Political, Ethical and Cultural Thought Program, Alexander, PhD in poli sci, professor of poli sci at JHU, *Beyond Biopolitics: Theory, violence, and horror in world politics,* pp. 66)

Among other things, what Dillon's thought on emergent living/being indicates is that it is time to push Foucault's thought on the biopolitical production of fear much further, perhaps beyond its biopolitical confines. For when we (and others) intimate the presence of a biopolitical productivity of fear or terror today, what we are pointing to is the existence of a fear of fear itself, or of a fear of being fearful. Docile and normalized bodies of biopolitical and governmentality regimes are not just afraid of not being able to live their normal life, as we hinted at above. They are also to be seen as emergent living forms that are designed to fear being afraid of living a life that has fear/terror as its vital impulse but also that are incapable of escaping such a terror. This is yet another dimension of the horror that awaits emergent “living things” as they are fixed or frozen by a fear of being afraid that, once again, allows them to be anticipatory and on the qui vive, but also prevents them from moving away from such a condition (here, we can recall Cavarero's useful distinction between terror and its capacity to put bodies in motion and horror and its paralyzing effects, as we mentioned in the “Introduction”). As we saw with the “swine flu” case, emergent humans fear being afraid not so much of the spreading disease and its social and physiological effects. Rather, they fear the terror that the disease (or any other danger) comes to represent. But this fear of the terror itself is unavoidable and, in a way, desirable or required for emergent life. By treating the pandemic (or the weather catastrophe, or the terrorist attack, or the nuclear scare, and so on) no longer as a possible natural or man-made disaster but as terror itself, a terror that, as Cavarero has argued, envelops one in fear but also opens up the door for horrific violence, 78 emergent living things deprive themselves of any possible solution or any resistant technology of living or being human that, perhaps, could tackle the problem that is said to be at the source of the terror (the so-called danger, although one should wonder whether such a danger matters at all as any encounter or circumstance in the life of emergent beings appears to be amenable to being the next terror). 79 Instead, the only way for emergent living things to deal with the impending doom is to fear more and more, that is to say, to produce more and more terror situations that will end up proliferating even more self-monitoring, self-carceralizing, and self-effacing techniques and dispositifs that, in turn, will confirm that they indeed had good reasons to be fearful in the first place. For today's emergent humanity, there is indeed nothing to fear but fear itself.

## Off

#### Larry Summers will not be nominated to the Federal Reserve now because Obama has insufficient political capital

Dayen, 9/9

David Dayen, news reporter for the New Reporter; “These Three Democrats Could Torpedo Larry Summers's Nomination,” 9/9/2013, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114649/larry-summers-federal-reserve-nomination-trouble-senate-dems //bghs-ms

But might a Summers nomination be D.O.A. in the Senate? Outside groups have already plotted behind the scenes to stop Summers; his allies in the White House will doubtlessly respond with a campaign of their own. But Summers’ biggest obstacle is simple math: He has to be able to count to 12. Twelve is the number of votes Summers would need to advance out of the Senate Banking Committee, which poses the **biggest challenge to confirmation**. Generally speaking, a presidential appointee cannot advance to the executive calendar and a final Senate vote without a positive recommendation from the committee of jurisdiction. The last time a committee nearly derailed a high-profile nominee domination was John Bolton’s appointment as U.N. Ambassador in 2005. Eventually, Bolton’s nomination went to the full Senate under highly unusual circumstances. Republican Senators George Voinovich and Lincoln Chafee did not support Bolton, but they agreed not to block the nomination if the committee advanced Bolton to the floor with "no endorsement" instead of a recommendation. It’s unclear whether anti-Summers Democrats will give the same leeway. The Wall Street Journal, citing unnamed Senate aides, suggested that three Banking Committee Democrats would oppose Summers: Sherrod Brown, Jeff Merkley and Elizabeth Warren. The three have created an ad hoc pro-financial reform coalition inside the committee, dedicated to tighter regulations and more vigorous policing of Wall Street. Warren told me last month that she greatly respected Brown and Merkley, and saw them as forming “a core of people really engaged with the issues.” Sherrod Brown has already gone public with his opposition to Summers. He circulated the letter urging Obama to choose current Fed Vice Chair Janet Yellen for the position. Neither Merkley nor Warren have publicly stated they would oppose Summers in committee, and the Journal report didn’t come from either of their offices. But Merkley has been quite critical of a potential Summers choice from the moment it was floated. “If you nominate someone who is a life-committed deregulator to be in a regulatory position … why is this person appropriate?” he asked Bloomberg in late July. For Warren’s part, she and Summers have sparred for years, owing to their different worldviews about the role of the financial sector in the economy. Speaking of Summers and Timothy Geithner on the "Charlie Rose Show" in 2010, Warren said, “I think they approach the economy and the world through the largest institutions ... I spent 25 years somewhere else.” Summers reportedly opposed picking Warren as the inaugural director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Democrats hold a 12-10 advantage on the committee, and a tie means no advancement. So every Democrat Summers loses must be made up for by a Republican willing to cross the aisle. Though no Republican has yet come forward to support Summers, one can imagine Bob Corker and Mike Johanns, who voted in committee to advance Ben Bernanke for a second term at the Fed in 2009, offering their votes. But after that, it becomes harder to figure. Mark Kirk and Dean Heller are potential targets, but not guarantees. It may hinge on whether Mike Crapo, the ranking Republican on the Banking Committee, wants to enforce party discipline. Moreover, Summers may need more than three votes. Heidi Heitkamp and Joe Manchin, both newcomers on the committee, have not stated their positions on a potential Summers nomination. Both of them come from red states (North Dakota and West Virginia) that are skeptical of the banking establishment, and both perceive political benefit from showing independence from a president whom their constituents don’t like. Witness the position of another red state Democrat, Alaska’s Mark Begich. Though not on the Banking Committee, Begich said he would oppose the Summers nomination on the Senate floor, citing his indifference to the foreclosure crisis. He planned to write a letter to the White House detailing his concerns with the choice. Begich’s opposition shows what a heavy lift the White House would have maneuvering Summers through a skeptical Democratic caucus. Nineteen Democrats and independent Angus King signed the Sherrod Brown letter supporting Yellen. One Senate aide told me that the nomination would “tear the caucus apart,” and that such a bitter nomination battle would simply not be worth the effort. No Federal Reserve chairman has ever received less than 70 votes on the Senate floor (Ben Bernanke in 2009). A brutal process that ends with Summers squeaking by, or losing, would damage the White House’s ability to get support from Congress on just about anything. That’s doubly true in the context of this week’s Senate vote authorizing military force against Syria. Political capital is a finite resource, and the White House having to struggle to put together a coalition for Summers after doing the same tough work on Syria may be **too much** of a lift, especially amid difficult upcoming votes on the budget and the debt limit. Participants in the grassroots campaign to stop Summers think that over the past week, the momentum has shifted in their direction. Providing intellectual heft to the fight was a high-profile New York Times piece over the weekend by Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, who hammered Summers, arguing that his “conduct and judgment in the crises was as flawed as his lack of commitment in that regard.” While labor has not added financial resources to the anti-Summers coalition, AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka did say in a briefing yesterday that “we think Yellen has earned the right to head the Fed,” praising her attention to the full employment mandate and her early predictions of a potential financial crisis. It’s hard to find one member of the labor-left alliance who would be enthused by a Summers selection.

#### Summers’ nomination collapses the economy and massively increases poverty – the alternative is Yellen who solves growth

Stiglitz, 9/6

Joseph E. Stiglitz, American economist and a professor at Columbia University, recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences and the John Bates Clark Medal, former senior vice president and chief economist of the World Bank, and former member and Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; “Why Janet Yellen, Not Larry Summers, Should Lead the Fed,” 9/6/2013, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/why-janet-yellen-not-larry-summers-should-lead-the-fed //bghs-ms

The controversy over the choice of the next head of the Federal Reserve has become unusually heated. The country is fortunate to have an enormously qualified candidate: the Fed’s current vice chairwoman, Janet L. Yellen. There is concern that the president might turn to another candidate, Lawrence H. Summers. Since I have worked closely with both of these individuals for more than three decades, both inside and outside of government, I have perhaps a distinct perspective. But why, one might ask, is this a matter for a column usually devoted to understanding the growing divide between rich and poor in the United States and around the world? The reason is simple: What the Fed does has as much to do with the growth of inequality as virtually anything else. The good news is that both of the leading candidates talk as if they care about inequality. The bad news is that the policies that have been pushed by one of the candidates, Mr. Summers, have much to do with the woes faced by the middle and the bottom. The Fed has responsibilities both in regulation and macroeconomic management. Regulatory failures were at the **core of America’s crisis**. As a Treasury Department official during the Clinton administration, Mr. Summers supported banking deregulation, including the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which was pivotal in America’s financial crisis. His great “achievement” as secretary of the Treasury, from 1999 to 2001, was passage of the law that ensured that derivatives would not be regulated — a decision that helped blow up the financial markets. (Warren E. Buffett was right to call these derivatives “**financial weapons of mass financial destruction**.” Some of those who were responsible for these key policy mistakes have admitted the fundamental “flaws” in their analyses. Mr. Summers, to my knowledge, has not.) Regulatory failures have been at the center of previous crises as well. At Treasury in the 1990s, Mr. Summers encouraged countries to quickly liberalize their capital markets, to allow capital to flow in and out without restrictions — indeed insisted that they do so — against the advice of the White House Council of Economic Advisers (which I led from 1995 to 1997), and this more than anything else led to the Asian financial crisis. **Few policies or actions have greater culpability for that Asian crisis and the global financial crisis of 2008 than the deregulatory policies that Mr. Summers advocated**. Supporters of Mr. Summers argue that he is exceptionally qualified to manage crises — and that, while we hope that there won’t be a crisis in the next four years, prudence requires someone who excels at those critical moments. To be fair, Mr. Summers has been involved in several crises. What matters, however, is not just “being there” during a crisis, but showing good judgment in its management. Even more important is a commitment to taking actions to make another crisis less likely — in sharp contrast to measures that almost **ensure the inevitability of another one**. Mr. Summers’s conduct and judgment in the crises was as flawed as his lack of commitment in that regard. In both Asia and the United States, he seemed to me to underestimate the severity of the downturns, and with forecasts that were so off, it was not a surprise that the policies were inappropriate. The performance of those in the Treasury who were responsible for managing the Asian crisis was, to say the least, disappointing — **converting downturns into recessions and recessions into depressions**. So, too, while the banking system was saved, and the United States avoided another depression, those responsible for managing the 2008 crisis cannot be credited with creating a robust, inclusive recovery. Botched efforts at mortgage restructuring, a failure to restore the flow of credit to small and medium-size enterprises, and the mishandling of the bailouts have all been well documented — as was the failure to foresee the **severity of the economic collapse**. These issues are important to anyone concerned with inequality for four reasons. First, crises and how they are managed are real creators of poverty and inequality. Just look at what havoc this crisis wrought: median wealth fell by 40 percent, those in the middle still have not seen their incomes recover to pre-crisis levels, and those in the upper 1 percent enjoyed all the fruits of the recovery (and then some). It is ordinary workers who have suffered most: they are the ones who face high unemployment, who see their wages cut, and who bear the brunt of cutbacks in public services as a result of the budget austerity. They are the ones who lost their homes in the millions. The Obama administration could have done more, far more, to help homeowners, and to help localities maintain public services (for instance, through the kind of revenue sharing with states and localities that I urged at the beginning of the crisis). Second, deregulation contributed to the financialization of the economy. It distorted our economy. It provided greater scope for those who manipulate the rules of the game for their benefit. As James K. Galbraith has forcefully argued, as we look around the world, bloated and underregulated financial sectors are closely linked with greater inequality. Those, like Britain, that emulated America’s deregulation have seen inequality soar, too. Third, the most invidious aspect of this deregulation-induced inequality is that associated with the abusive practices of the financial sector — which prospers at the expense of ordinary Americans, through predatory lending, market manipulation, abusive credit card practices or taking advantage of its monopoly power in the payments system. The Fed has enormous powers to prevent these abuses, and even more since the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Yet the central bank has repeatedly failed at this, systematically focusing on strengthening the banks’ balance sheets, at the expense of ordinary Americans. Fourth, it is not only the case that America’s financial sector did what it shouldn’t have done, but it also didn’t do what it was supposed to do. Even today, there is a dearth of loans to small and medium-size enterprises. Good regulation would shift banks away from speculation and market manipulation, back to what should be their core business: making loans. Whoever succeeds Ben S. Bernanke as the Fed’s leader will have to make repeated judgment calls about when to raise or lower interest rates, the levers of monetary policy. Two elements enter into these judgments. The first is forecasting. Wrong forecasts lead to wrong policies. Without a good sense of direction of where the economy is going, one can’t take appropriate policies. Ms. Yellen has a superb record in forecasting where the economy is going — the best, according to The Wall Street Journal, of anyone at the Fed. As I noted earlier, Mr. Summers’s leaves something to be desired. Ms. Yellen’s superlative performance should not come as a surprise. Janet Yellen, whom I taught at Yale, was one of the best students I have had, in 47 seven years of teaching at Columbia, Princeton, Stanford, Yale, M.I.T. and Oxford. She is an economist of great intellect, with a strong ability to forge consensus, and she has proved her mettle as chairwoman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (she succeeded me in that role), as president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, from 2004 to 2010, and in her current role, as the Fed’s No. 2. Ms. Yellen brings to bear an understanding not just of financial markets and monetary policy, but also of labor markets — which is essential at a time when unemployment and wage stagnation are primary concerns. The second element of Fed policy making is risk assessment: if one steps on the brakes too hard, one risks excessively high unemployment; too gently, one risks inflation. Ms. Yellen has shown herself to be not only excellent in forecasting, but balanced. Legitimate questions have been raised: Would Mr. Summers, with his close connections with Wall Street, reflect financiers’ single-minded focus on inflation, and be more worried about the effects on bond prices than on ordinary Americans? In the past, central banks have focused excessively on inflation. Indeed, this single-minded focus, with little regard to financial stability, not only has contributed to the crisis, but as I argued in my book “Freefall,” it has also contributed to the declining share of total income that is earned by ordinary workers. Though the willingness to take actions to prevent crises, and good judgments in a crisis, are undoubtedly critical in the choice of the next Fed chair, there are other important considerations. The Fed is a large organization that has to be managed — and Ms. Yellen demonstrated her management skills at the San Francisco Fed. One has to obtain consensus among a diverse group of strong-minded individuals, some more worried about inflation, some more worried about unemployment. We need someone who knows how to build consensus, not someone who excels in bullying, who knows how to listen to and respect the views of others. When I was chairman of Economic Policy Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, I saw how effectively Ms. Yellen represented the United States, and the respect in which she was held. In the ensuing years, she has gained in stature, and today has the enormous respect of central bank governors around the world. She has the judgement, wisdom and gravitas one should expect of the leader of the Fed. Finally, the Fed is an enormously important institution, but regrettably, its conduct in the years before Ms. Yellen took up her role in Washington — both its failures in dealing with the bubble and certain aspects of its conduct in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (like the lack of transparency) — has undermined confidence in it. It is important that President Obama’s nominee not be — or even be seen to be — acting at the behest of financial markets. That person cannot be someone who can be tainted even by an accusation of conflict of interest, which is inevitable with the “revolving door” that has too often been associated with the regulation of this sector. Nor should it be someone who suffers from “cognitive capture” by Wall Street. At the same time, the person has to have the confidence of the financial markets, and a deep understanding of those markets. Ms. Yellen has managed to do this — an impressive achievement in its own right. One might say that the country is fortunate to have two candidates who, as the Harvard economist Kenneth S. Rogoff, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, writes, are “brilliant scholars with extensive experience in public service.” But brilliance is not the only determinant of performance. Values, judgment and personality matter, too. **The choices have seldom been so stark, the stakes so large**. No wonder that the choice of the Fed leader has stirred such emotion. Ms. Yellen has a truly impressive record in each of the jobs she has undertaken. The country has before it one candidate who played a pivotal role in creating the economic problems that we confront today, and another candidate of enormous stature, experience and judgment.

#### Economic growth solves great power war and decline causes it

Khalilzad 11 (Zalmay Khalilzhad, Bush’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the UN and former director policy planning at the DOD; “The Economy and National Security”, National Review, 2-8-11, <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad>)

Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers. The current recession is the result of a deep [financial crisis](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad), not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual [interest payments](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial [tax increases](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. [debt problem](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today. The policy question is how to enhance [economic growth](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?pg=2) and employment while cutting discretionary spending in the near term and curbing the growth of entitlement spending in the out years. Republican members of Congress have outlined a plan. Several think tanks and commissions, including President Obama’s debt commission, have done so as well. Some consensus exists on measures to pare back the recent increases in domestic spending, restrain future growth in defense spending, and reform the tax code (by reducing tax expenditures while lowering individual and corporate rates). These are promising options. The key remaining question is whether the president and leaders of both parties on Capitol Hill have the will to act and the skill to fashion bipartisan solutions. Whether we take the needed actions is a choice, however difficult it might be. It is clearly within our capacity to put our economy on a better trajectory. In garnering political support for cutbacks, the president and members of Congress should point not only to the domestic consequences of inaction — but also to the geopolitical implications. As the United States gets its economic and fiscal house in order, it should take steps to prevent a flare-up in Asia. The United States can do so by signaling that its domestic challenges will not impede its intentions to check Chinese expansionism. This can be done in cost-efficient ways. While China’s economic rise enables its military modernization and international assertiveness, it also frightens rival powers. The Obama administration has wisely moved to strengthen relations with allies and potential partners in the region but more can be done. Some Chinese policies encourage other parties to join with the United States, and the U.S. should not let these opportunities pass. China’s military assertiveness should enable security cooperation with countries on China’s periphery — particularly Japan, India, and Vietnam — in ways that complicate Beijing’s strategic calculus. China’s mercantilist policies and currency manipulation — which harm developing states both in East Asia and elsewhere — should be used to fashion a coalition in favor of a more balanced trade system. Since Beijing’s over-the-top reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese democracy activist alienated European leaders, highlighting human-rights questions would not only draw supporters from nearby countries but also embolden reformers within China. Since the end of the Cold War, a stable economic and financial condition at home has enabled America to have an expansive role in the world. Today we can no longer take this for granted. Unless we get our economic house in order, there is a risk that domestic stagnation in combination with the rise of rival powers will undermine our ability to deal with growing international problems. Regional hegemons in Asia could seize the moment, leading the world toward a new, dangerous era of multi-polarity.

## Off

#### Interpretation: Removing selective restrictions on specific goods isn’t “economic” because it doesn’t broadly affect economic life

Davidsson 3 – Elias Davidsson, Human Rights Researcher and Activist, Reporter for the Arab American News, Contributing Editor for Global Research, “The Mechanism of Economic Sanctions: Changing Perceptions and Euphemisms”, November, www.aldeilis.net/english/attachments/2877\_econsanc-debate.pdf‎

“Economic sanctions”, a mode of coercion in international relations resuscitated in recent years, has prompted renewed and lively scholarly interest in the subject. Why have such measures become so popular? One answer is that they “constitute a means of exerting international influence that is more powerful than diplomatic mediation but lies below the threshold of military intervention”[1]. Another answer is that “they engage comparatively less internal political resistance than other candidate strategies [...]. They do not generate sombre processions of body bags bringing home the mortal remains of the sons and daughters of constituents”[2], in other words, they cost little to the side imposing the sanctions. The notable predilection by the United States for economic sanctions [3], suggests that such a tool is particularly useful for economically powerful states that are themselves relatively immune to such measures. This tool of collective economic coercion, with antecedents such as siege warfare and blockade going back to biblical time [4], was used during most of the 20th Century, particularly in war situations. Although the United Nations Charter, drafted during the later stages of World War II, includes provisions for the imposition of economic sanctions (Article 41), the Security Council - empowered to resort to this tool - only used it twice between 1945 and 1990, against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. In our discussion we designate economic sanctions as “coordinated restrictions on trade and/or financial transactions intended to impair economic life within a given territory”[5]. To the extent that measures intend to impair “economic life within a given territory” through restrictions on trade and/or finance, they constitute, for our purposes, *economic* sanctions. Selective or individualized measures, such as restrictions on specific goods (arms, luxury items, some forms of travel), are therefore not considered as *economic* sanctions. Symbolic economic deprivations, such as partial withholding of aid, do not amount to economic sanctions if their intended effect is primarily to convey displeasure, rather than to affect the economy.

## Off

#### Turn – Dutch Disease – Increasing resource production causes Dutch Disease – drives up prices for domestic goods and services, wrecking the economy

Holland, Energy Trends Insider, 12

[Andrew, 6-7-12, Energy Trends Insider, “Will Dutch Disease Follow-on the American Energy Boom?,” <http://www.energytrendsinsider.com/2012/06/07/will-dutch-disease-follow-on-the-american-energy-boom/>, accessed 7-12-13, MSG]

An ongoing discussion among some of us analysts at Consumer Energy Report has been about whether having natural resources like oil or coal is actually beneficial to a country (see Are Countries With Vast Oil Resources Blessed or Cursed?, Oil Dependence — Tom Friedman’s False Narrative, and Oil — Easy to Produce, But Not Easy to Buy). The argument which I’ve made is that a boom in natural resources production can cover up some short-sighted economic policies; in effect, the earnings from producing oil mean that countries do not have to invest in their education or produce their own manufactured goods. The other side of the argument is that it can only be a good thing for new resources to be found. Leaving aside the question of whether natural resource wealth undermines institutions or causes corruption (and there is good evidence of a resource curse among developing countries) there is one thing that increased production of oil does, once it gets to be a big enough sector of the economy: it pushes up the value of that country’s currency. All else equal (as economists always have to say), new production of natural resources strengthens the domestic currency. That’s because those resources are either exported or are used to replace imports. Dutch Disease Phenomenon Now – I should mention that I like a strong dollar, personally: it means I can afford to travel abroad more, and buy more when I get there. It also means that French wine (for example) becomes cheaper relative to Californian wine. I like French wine, and would welcome being able to buy more. However, that shows the problem with having a strong currency — it undermines domestic manufacturing and production (of Californian wine, in this example) by driving up prices of American-made goods and services. This phenomenon is called “Dutch Disease.” Coined by The Economist in 1977 to describe how finding natural gas in the North Sea in 1959 affected the Netherlands’ economy over the ensuing decades. The symptoms of the ‘disease’ are when commodity exports push up the value of a nation’s currency, making other parts of the economy less competitive. This leads to a current-account deficit, which makes the economy even more dependent upon the commodity. The disease is especially pernicious for commodities like oil, coal, and natural gas because these industries are very capital-intensive, and actually do not generate that many jobs. There are two major industrialized countries that have undergone commodities booms over the past decade: Canada and Australia. They are both showing signs of suffering from Dutch Disease, with the Canadian dollar increasing in value vs. the American dollar (Canada’s #1 trading partner by far) by over 50% in the last ten years, and the Australian dollar increased in value compared to world currency rates by almost 70% in the past decade.

#### Dutch Disease as it pertains to resource production vastly increases the risk of divides that lead to civil wars, genocide, and all forms of instability

Shaxson, Chatham House Associate Fellow, 7

[Nicholas, November 2007, Royal Institute of International Affairs, “Oil, Corruption, and the Resource Curse,” jstor, p 1127-1128, Accessed 7/13/13, CB]

Consider two different hypothetical countries: Agricolia, an agricultural¶ economy, and Petroland, which depends entirely on oil. Both are divided politically¶ between North and South. When Southern Agricolia has a bumper crop, this doesn't¶ necessarily harm North Agricolia. because it doesn't take anything away from it (and¶ the North's residents may even benefit from more economic activity nearby).

Petroland is different. The total amount of oil money available for the whole¶ country this year is a given: it depends on world oil prices, the oil contracts,¶ technology, geology, financing and oil production rates, and there isn't much¶ ordinary citizens can do to change any of these variables in this economic enclave.¶ Sharing out this fixed sum of money is a zero-sum game: more for the South means¶ less for the North. Here is a classic recipe for conflict. Now, even if North and South¶ settle on a formula, the problem isn't over yet—for the Northeast will now have to¶ compete with the Northwest. And so on, down to village level—as inhabitants of¶ the Niger Delta, used to fighting for a share of local spoils, will attest. The drivers¶ of conflict spread downwards, fragmenting society at each level. For example, after¶ Nigeria's independence in 1960, the state split from three regions into four, then¶ into twelve states, then 19, 21, 31; today there are 36. This subdivision was driven¶ to a significant degree by divide-and-rule politics and the complaints of minorities¶ in each state about not getting a fair share of the 'cake'. Yet each subdivision simply¶ created new configurations, new minorities and more numerous divisions.

The economist William Easterly describes cross-country studies which highlight how ethnically diverse societies suffer, among other things, a significantly¶ higher probability of civil war and of genocide, and higher black market premiums,¶ as well as far lower economic growth, lower schooling rates and fewer paved roads.¶ He points out that economists and donors, however, have paid remarkably little¶ atrention to the effects of ethnic polarization on economic growth. Analysis needs¶ to move further, beyond seeing ethnic (and other) diversity as a static phenom-¶ enon, and understand better how polarization and social fragmentation—and the¶ perceptions of these divisions—are affected by conflicts over mineral money, and¶ how all these factors in turn impact on poverty, growth, corruption and conflict.

The divisions (and perceptions of divisions) are not always ethnic or religious.¶ One case in point would be the kind of rural/urban divide that was for years a¶ key part of UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi's discourse, and an important¶ factor in the Angolan civil wars. Divisions can involve political factions that arc¶ not ethnically based. Another example would be horizontal divisions, such as that¶ which is apparent in all oil-dependent countries between the charmed elites and¶ the masses of poor. Empirically, there is plenty of evidence that more divided¶ societies perform less well than more homogeneous ones: 'Societies divided into¶ factions fight over division of the spoils,\* Easterly wrote; 'societies unified by a¶ common culture and a strong middle class create a consensus for growth—growth¶ that includes the poor." (In fact, he characterized the idea of factions acting in their¶ own interests as being chiefly responsible for bad government policies as the key¶ insight in the field of political economy.)

#### Cuban collapse causes Latin American instability, failed states, and exacerbates global conflicts

Gorrell ‘5 (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18/5, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074>)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

#### That causes nuclear war and extinction

Manwaring ‘5 – adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson

(Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)  
President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as *Bolivarianismo.* More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s *Sendero Luminoso* calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

China outweighs and won’t be influenced by the plan

Harvey, environment reporter – the Guardian, 11/9/’11

(Fiona, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change>)

Birol also warned that China – the world's biggest emitter – would have to take on a much greater role in combating climate change. For years, Chinese officials have argued that the country's emissions per capita were much lower than those of developed countries, it was not required to take such stringent action on emissions. But the IEA's analysis found that within about four years, China's per capita emissions were likely to exceed those of the EU. In addition, by 2035 at the latest, China's cumulative emissions since 1900 are likely to exceed those of the EU, which will further weaken Beijing's argument that developed countries should take on more of the burden of emissions reduction as they carry more of the responsibility for past emissions. In a recent interview with the Guardian recently, China's top climate change official, Xie Zhenhua, called on developing countries to take a greater part in the talks, while insisting that developed countries must sign up to a continuation of the Kyoto protocol – something only the European Union is willing to do. His words were greeted cautiously by other participants in the talks. Continuing its gloomy outlook, the IEA report said: "There are few signs that the urgently needed change in direction in global energy trends is under way. Although the recovery in the world economy since 2009 has been uneven, and future economic prospects remain uncertain, global primary energy demand rebounded by a remarkable 5% in 2010, pushing CO2 emissions to a new high. Subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption of fossil fuels jumped to over $400bn (£250.7bn)." Meanwhile, an "unacceptably high" number of people – about 1.3bn – still lack access to electricity. If people are to be lifted out of poverty, this must be solved – but providing people with renewable forms of energy generation is still expensive. Charlie Kronick of Greenpeace said: "The decisions being made by politicians today risk passing a monumental carbon debt to the next generation, one for which they will pay a very heavy price. What's seriously lacking is a global plan and the political leverage to enact it. Governments have a chance to begin to turn this around when they meet in Durban later this month for the next round of global climate talks." One close observer of the climate talks said the $400bn subsidies devoted to fossil fuels, uncovered by the IEA, were "staggering", and the way in which these subsidies distort the market presented a massive problem in encouraging the move to renewables. He added that Birol's comments, though urgent and timely, were unlikely to galvanise China and the US – the world's two biggest emittters – into action on the international stage."The US can't move (owing to Republican opposition) and there's no upside for China domestically in doing so. At least China is moving up the learning curve with its deployment of renewables, but it's doing so in parallel to the hugely damaging coal-fired assets that it is unlikely to ever want (to turn off in order to) to meet climate targets in years to come."

**Nuclear war is likely**

**Perkins, 7** – Staff Writer @ My Wire (Sid, [http://www.mywire.com/a/ScienceNews/Sudden-chill-even-limited](http://www.mywire.com/a/ScienceNews/Sudden-chill-even-limitednuclear/2906831?page=2)

[nuclear/2906831?page=2](http://www.mywire.com/a/ScienceNews/Sudden-chill-even-limitednuclear/2906831?page=2))

"While there's a perception that a nuclear build down by the world's major powers in recent decades has somehow resolved the global nuclear threat, a more accurate portrayal is that we're at a perilous crossroads," says Brian Toon, an atmospheric scientist at the University of Colorado at Boulder and one of the researchers who first floated the idea of a nuclear winter. Today's threat stems from a variety of factors, Toon and his colleagues say. Nations are joining the nuclear club with unnerving regularity, others are suspected of having ambitions to do so, and dozens more have enough uranium and plutonium on hand to build at least a few Hiroshima-size bombs. The leaders of some of these nations may have no qualms about using such weapons, even against a nonnuclear neighbor. Increasingly, people are living in large cities, which make tempting targets. Finally, the results of today's climate simulations--which are **much more sophisticated** than those that were available in the 1980s--suggest that even a nuclear exchange of just a few dozen weapons could cool Earth **substantially** for a decade or more. The current combination of nuclear proliferation, political instability, and urban demographics "forms perhaps the greatest danger to the stability of human society since the dawn of man," warns Toon. Recognizing this danger, on Jan. 17, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the minute hand on its "doomsday clock" 2 minutes closer to midnight. "It's been 60 years since nuclear weapons have been used in war, but the psychological barriers that have helped limit the potential for the use of nuclear weapons in this country and others seems to be breaking down" says Lawrence M. Krauss, a member of the group and a physicist at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. JOIN THE CLUB In 1950, there were two nuclear powers--the United States, whose Manhattan Project developed the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, and the Soviet Union, which conducted its first nuclear test in August 1949. By 1968, when the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was proposed, France, the United Kingdom, and China had joined the pack. Outside that treaty from its beginning, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have developed weapons and conducted tests. Also, Israel is widely suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. A handful of nations once possessed nuclear weapons but abandoned them. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan inherited warheads when the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991 but have since transferred those weapons to Russia. South Africa has admitted constructing, but later disassembling, six nuclear devices, possibly after one test, says Toon. In total, he says, at least 19 nations are now known to have programs to develop nuclear weapons or to have previously pursued that goal. Many more nations, through their power-generating and research nuclear reactor programs, have the raw materials for constructing nuclear devices, he and his colleagues reported in December 2006 at a meeting of the American Geophysical Union in San Francisco. Those raw materials aren't scarce: At least 40 nations have enough uranium and plutonium on hand to construct substantial nuclear arsenals. Disturbingly, some of the nations with abundant bomb material have or have recently had strained relations with their neighbors. At the end of 2003, for example, Brazil probably had enough plutonium on hand to make more than 200 Hiroshima-size bombs, while its former rival Argentina could have produced 1300 such bombs. Although North Korea probably has enough nuclear material to fabricate only a handful of the devices, South Korea has enough plutonium to construct at least 4,400. Pakistan could make 100 or more nuclear bombs, and its neighbor India could put together well over 10 times as many, the researchers estimate. Today, at least 13 nations operate facilities that enrich uranium, plutonium, or both, says Toon. Altogether, 45 nations are known to have previous nuclear weapons programs, current weapons stockpiles, or the potential to become nuclear states.

**Nuclear winter causes extinction – newest models, scientific consensus**

**Robock 11** – Profesor of environmental sciences at Rutgers (Alan, “Nuclear winter is a real and present danger”, Nature, Volume: 473, Pages: 275–276)

Yet the environmental threat of nuclear war has not gone away. The world faces the prospect of a smaller, but still catastrophic, nuclear conflict. There are now nine nuclear-weapons states. Use of a fraction of the global nuclear arsenal by anyone, from the superpowers to India versus Pakistan, still presents the largest potential environmental danger to the planet by humans. That threat is being ignored. One reason for this denial is that the prospect of a nuclear war is so horrific on so many levels that most people simply look away. Two further reasons are myths that persist among the general public: that the nuclear winter theory has been disproved, and that nuclear winter is no longer a threat. These myths need to be debunked. The term 'nuclear winter', coined by Carl Sagan and his colleagues in a 1983 paper1 in Science, describes the dramatic effects on the climate caused by smoke from fires ignited by nuclear attacks on cities and industrial areas. In the 1980s my colleagues and I calculated, using the best climate models available at the time, that if one-third of the existing arsenal was used, there would be so much smoke that surface temperatures would plummet below freezing around the world for months, killing virtually all plants and producing worldwide famine. More people could die in China from starvation than in the nations actively bombing each other. As many countries around the world realized that a superpower nuclear war would be a disaster for them, they pressured the superpowers to end their arms race. Sagan did a good job of summarizing the policy impacts2 in 1984: although weapons were continuing to be built, it would be suicide to use them. The idea of climatic catastrophe was fought against by those who wanted to keep the nuclear-weapon industry alive, or who supported the growth of nuclear arsenals politically3. Scientifically, there was no real debate about the concept, only about the details. In 1986, atmospheric researchers Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs appraising the theory4 and highlighting what they saw as the patchiness of the effect. They coined the term 'nuclear autumn', noting that it wouldn't be 'winter' everywhere in the aftermath of a nuclear attack. They didn't mean for people to think that it would be all raking leaves and football games, but many members of the public, and some pro-nuclear advocates, preferred to take it that way. The fight over the details of the modelling caused a rift between Sagan and Schneider that never healed. When I bring up the topic of nuclear winter, people invariably tell me that they think the theory has been disproved. But research continues to support the original concept. By 2007, models had began to approximate a realistic atmosphere up to 80 kilometres above Earth's surface, including the stratosphere and mesosphere. This enabled me, and my coauthors, to calculate for the first time that smoke particles would be heated by the Sun and lifted into the upper stratosphere, where they would stay for many years5, 6. So the cooling would last for much longer than we originally thought. Dark days Many of those who do accept the nuclear-winter concept think that the scenario applies only to a mass conflict, on a scale no longer conceivable in the modern world. This is also false. A 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each using 50 Hiroshima-size bombs (far less than 1% of the current arsenal), if dropped on megacity targets in each country would produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history5. Five million tonnes of black carbon smoke would be emitted into the upper troposphere from the burning cities, and then be lofted into the stratosphere by the heat of the Sun. Temperatures would be lower than during the 'Little Ice Age' (1400–1850), during which famine killed millions. For several years, growing seasons would be shortened by weeks in the mid-latitudes (see 'A decade of cooling).

**Err affirmative—cities have grown—their studies understate the impact**

**Stenchikov et al, 7** – Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder, (Georgiy L., “Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current”, 5 July 2007)

[18] We do not conduct detailed new studies of the smoke and dust emissions from nuclear attacks here. Rather, we chose emissions based on previous studies so as to make our results comparable to them. Toon et al. [2007] point out that **cities around the world have grown in the past 20 years, so that we would expect smoke emissions to be larger than before for the same targets.** We encourage new analyses of the exact amount of smoke that would result, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. **Roughly 150 Tg would be emitted by the use of the entire current global nuclear arsenal**, with 5000 Mt explosive power, about 95% of which is in the arsenals of the United States and Russia (Table 2), and 50 Tg would be emitted by the use of 1/3 of the current nuclear arsenal.

# 2NC

## PTX

#### Stiglitz says Summers’ policies create lead to mass poverty --- independently that outweighs

Gilligan 96[James, professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School, Director of the Center for the Study of Violence, and a member of the Academic Advisory Council of the National Campaign Against Youth Violence, Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes, p 191-196]

The deadliest form of violence is poverty**.** You cannot work for one day with the violent people who fill our prisons and mental hospitals for the criminally insane without being forcible and constantly reminded of the extreme poverty and discrimination that characterizes their lives. Hearing about their lives, and about their families and friends, you are forced to recognize the truth in Gandhi’s observation that the deadliest form of violence is poverty. Not a day goes by without realizing that trying to understand them and their violent behavior in purely individual terms is impossible and wrong-headed. Any theory of violence, especially a psychological theory, that evolves from the experience of men in maximum security prisons and hospitals for the criminally insane must begin with the recognition that these institutions are only microcosms. They are not where the major violence in our society takes place, and the perpetrators who fill them are far from being the main causes of most violent deaths. Any approach to a theory of violence needs to begin with a look at the structural violence in this country. Focusing merely on those relatively few men who commit what we define as murder could distract us from examining and learning from those structural causes of violent death that are far more significant from a numerical or public health, or human, standpoint. By “structural violence” I mean the increased rates of death, and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society’s collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting “structural” with “behavioral violence,” by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. Structural violence differs from behavioral violence in at least three major respects. \*The lethal effects of structural violence operate continuously, rather than sporadically, whereas murders, suicides, executions, wars, and other forms of behavioral violence occur one at a time. \*Structural violence operates more or less independently of individual acts; independent of individuals and groups (politicians, political parties, voters) whose decisions may nevertheless have lethal consequences for others. \*Structural violence is normally invisible, because it may appear to have had other (natural or violent) causes. The finding that structural violence causes far more deaths than behavioral violence does is not limited to this country. Kohler and Alcock attempted to arrive at the number of excess deaths caused by socioeconomic inequities on a worldwide basis. Sweden was their model of the nation that had come closes to eliminating structural violence. It had the least inequity in income and living standards, and the lowest discrepancies in death rates and life expectancy; and the highest overall life expectancy in the world. When they compared the life expectancies of those living in the other socioeconomic systems against Sweden, they found that 18 million deaths a year could be attributed to the “structural violence” to which the citizens of all the other nations were being subjected. During the past decade, the discrepancies between the rich and poor nations have increased dramatically and alarmingly. The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those by genocide—or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232 million), it was clear that even war **cannot begin to compare with structural violence,** which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. **Structural violence is** also **the main cause of behavioral violence** on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to war and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence—structural or behavioral—is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.

## PTX - Impact

#### Econ decline turns clean tech and global warming

Richard 8 (Michael Graham, Environmental Activist and Contributor @ HuffPost, "4 Reasons Why Recession is BAD for the Environment," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-graham-richard/4-reasons-why-recession-i\_b\_133564.html)

As a counter-point to Lloyd's tongue-in-cheek post about 10 Ways the Recession Can Help the Environment, here are some eco-reasons why we should wish a speedy recovery (we won't get into non-green reasons here): Firstly, when squeezed, companies will reduce their investments into research & development and green programs. These are usually not short-term profit centers, so that is what's axed first. Some progress has been made in the past few years, it would be sad to lose ground now. Secondly, average people, when money is tight, will look for less expensive products (duh). Right now, that usually means that greener products won't make it. Maybe someday if we start taxing "bads" instead of "goods" (pollution, carbon, toxins instead of labor, income, capital gains) the least expensive products will also be the greenest, but right now that's not the case. Thirdly, there's less money going into the stock markets and bank loans are harder to get, which means that many small firms and startups working on the breakthrough green technologies of tomorrow can have trouble getting funds or can even go bankrupt, especially if their clients or backers decide to make cuts. Fourthly, during economic crises, voters want the government to appear to be doing something about the economy (even if it's government that screwed things up in the first place). They'll accept all kinds of measures and laws, including those that aren't good for the environment. Massive corn subsidies anyone? Don't even think about progress on global warming...

#### Growth key to check environmental degradation

Sagoff 1997 (Mark, Director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park, Atlantic Monthly, June, v279, n6, p. 80-96, [www.chem.brown.edu/chem12/readings/atlantic/consume.html](http://www.chem.brown.edu/chem12/readings/atlantic/consume.html))

Many have argued that economic activity, affluence, and growth automatically lead to resource depletion, environmental deterioration, and ecological collapse. Yet greater productivity and prosperity—which is what economists mean by growth—have become prerequisites for controlling urban pollution and protecting sensitive ecological systems such as rain forests. Otherwise, destitute people who are unable to acquire food and fuel will create pollution and destroy forests. Without economic growth, which also correlates with lower fertility, the environmental and population problems of the South will only get worse. For impoverished countries facing environmental disaster, economic growth may be the one thing that is sustainable.

#### Economic growth key to solve warming

Anderson 4 [Terry L. professor of economics at Montana State University, Ph.D. in economics <http://www.perc.org/articles/article446.php>]

Hansen's essay concludes on an optimistic note, saying "the main elements [new technologies] required to halt climate change have come into being with remarkable rapidity."This statement would not have surprised economist Julian Simon. He saw the "ultimate resource" to be the human mind and believed it to be best motivated by market forces. Because of a combination of market forces and technological innovations, we are not running out of natural resources. As a resource becomes more scarce, prices increase, thus encouraging development of cheaper alternatives and technological innovations. Just as fossil fuel replaced scarce whale oil, its use will be reduced by new technology and alternative fuel sources. Market forces also cause economic growth, which in turn leads to environmental improvements. Put simply, poor people are willing to sacrifice clean water and air, healthy forests, and wildlife habitat for economic growth. But as their incomes rise above subsistence, "economic growth helps to undo the damage done in earlier years," says economist Bruce Yandle. "If economic growth is good for the environment, policies that stimulate growth ought to be good for the environment."

## PTX - UQ

#### Syria drained Obama’s political capital --- he can’t nominate Summers now

Pisani, 9/9

Bob Pisani, CNBC “On-Air Stocks” Editor; “Will Syria keep Larry Summers out of the Fed?”, 9/9/2013, http://www.cnbc.com/id/101018967 //bghs-ms

After a week spent in San Francisco, I was most struck by trader commentary over the weekend that the President's bruising fight over Syria might **change the outlook** on the choice for the next Fed chairman. The argument went like this: the fight over Syria is not going well for President Obama. There is a high probability that the President may lose an outright vote in the House of Representatives (despite some support from John Boehner), or be forced to pull the resolution before there is a vote. This means that the President is in a weaker position to negotiate on his domestic agenda. (Read more: Kudlow—agenda crippled?) That would include Obamacare and an end to the sequester, but most importantly for Wall Street it may mean that he may not be as willing to support Larry Summers as the next Fed chairman, given the opposition that is already lined up against him. My point: this is a second-term President with very limited political capital. His popularity ratings are not far from new lows. (Read more: Companies sweating Obamacare tax) If he puts all his eggs into this basket, he will have less ammunition to fight the domestic fights.

## PTX - Link

4. Both Congress and Castro agree upon opening trade up to sugar

Dale McFeatters – National Columnist, writes for Washington Times and Scripps Howard News Service, 4/12/09, Rethinking Cuba, Korea Times, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2013/05/160\_42996.html

Congress is considering lifting the ban on travel by Americans to Cuba, which it should because Americans should be free to travel where they like without being harassed by their own government.¶ The Obama administration is moving toward lifting limits on how often Cuban Americans can visit and how much money they can send family members on the island, which is good because those limits were simply spiteful.¶ And there is growing support for easing the trade embargo on Cuba, which only makes sense because the embargo is closing in on 50 years of proven failure. It was counterproductive in that Fidel Castro regularly invoked it to excuse his economic mismanagement.¶ We already allow the sale of certain agricultural products to Cuba, and there's no reason farmers should be favored over other exporters.¶ If Cuba wants to send back cigars and rum and people think that consuming them would be supporting a dictatorship, don't drink the rum or smoke the cigars.¶ If we're going to persist in the delusion that ethanol is somehow going to be a workable substitute for gasoline, we're going to need additional sources of ethanol and Cuba has plenty of sugar cane.¶ A delegation from the Congressional Black Caucus visited Havana and reported back that the Castro brothers, the only voices that really count in Cuba, are ready for better relations with the United States.¶ According to the Associated Press, Raul Castro, who became interim leader of Cuba after Fidel's surgery in 2006 and was formally named president last year, told the delegation that "everything was on the table" in reopening dialogue with the United States.¶ Three of the members got a rare sit-down with Fidel. AP quoted Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Calif., as saying Castro "looked directly into our eyes" and asked, "How can we help President Obama?"